Great Britain and Russia’s civil war: “The necessity for a definite and coherent policy” by Fuller, H
1 
 
Great Britain and Russia’s Civil War: “The Necessity for a Definite and 
Coherent Policy” 
Howard Fuller 
University of Wolverhampton 
Of all the Allied Powers at the close of the First World War, Great Britain had the most interests at stake 
in the outcome of the Russian Civil War. No one bordered the former Russian Empire, so all talk of 
intervention began and ended with how Allied and Russian White forces might be supplied by seas 
controlled primarily by the Royal Navy. Any economic pressure upon the Bolshevik regime in the form 
of naval blockade was also contingent upon British policy. ‘Success’, wrote Richard H. Ullman, in his 
definitive study Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–21: Britain and the Russian Civil War, November 1918–
February 1920 (1968), ‘was almost invariably assumed to comprise the destruction and total 
displacement of the Soviet regime’1. But if the Russian Revolution was to be somehow overturned by 
Allied support of the Whites, if not outright military and naval intervention against the Reds, then the 
role of British sea power was crucial. Thus, when Ullman conclude that the final lunge for Petrograd by 
White forces under General Nikolai Yudenich in October 1919 failed due to ‘superior Soviet forces’ that, 
thanks to Trotsky’s personal intervention, finally managed to rally at the gates of the city and push back 
Yudenich in a decisive counter-offensive, he ignored the pivotal role of British naval forces in the region 
under the command of Rear- Admiral Walter Cowan. After all, even if Petrograd had been taken by 
White forces, it could not have been held if the Russian fortress island and naval base of Kronstadt, 
commanding the entrance to the Neva in the Gulf of Finland, remained in Bolshevik hands. Yudenich’s 
largely spent force would have quickly run out of supplies and food, not to mention the fate of the 
citizens in the occupied capital. No one could seriously entertain the thought of capturing Kronstadt 
without first clearing the minefields surrounding it — and these were protected in turn by the formidable 
12-inch guns of Fort Krasnaya Gorka (‘Red Hill’) on the southern shore. The Red Fleet, including two 
battleships, anchored in Kronstadt, remained a formidable threat. 
So the causal chain needed for a White victory in the Russian Civil War, at least on the Northern and 
Baltic fronts, arguably began with the need to overcome a Russian coastal fort, and only the Royal 
Navy possessed the firepower to do it. The British cabinet first made the decision to dispatch a light 
naval force of cruisers, destroyers, and minesweepers to the Baltic Provinces in November 1918, under 
the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Edwyn Alexander-Sinclair. ‘The general object is to show the British 
flag and support British policy in the Baltic’, the Admiralty informed him. ‘A subsidiary object may be 
supply of arms to Estonia’. But he was not to attack Kronstadt nor seek and destroy any Bolshevik 
warships2.  
When he was relieved in December by Cowan, British interests in the region were defined as follows: 
‘To prevent the destruction of the Estonian and Livonian provinces by external aggression; supporting 
them by sea but strictly avoiding “military operations”’. Soviet men-of-war, however, were to be 
assumed operating ‘with hostile intent and should be treated accordingly’3. Cowan’s 6th Light Cruiser 
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squadron could only accomplish so much, and whenever his ships strayed close to Kronstadt, they 
were soon under distant but deadly fire from Krasnaya Gorka, warding them away.  
British frustration on the scene and in Whitehall mounted throughout the remaining winter and early 
spring of 1919. ‘Protecting the Baltic States’ was one thing, but this did not equate to a defeat of 
Bolshevism at its source. This meant that the conflict could spiral on indefinitely, sapping British 
resources when Lloyd George’s government was beset with shortages and strikes, for example. It also 
gave the strategic initiative to the Soviets, who might lunge from behind their fortified naval base at any 
time and overwhelm the British fleet piecemeal. A memo by the C-in-C of the Atlantic Fleet predicted 
that German and Soviet naval forces might even combine against Allied warships if the Paris peace 
talks faltered4. Earlier ‘Notes on Bombarding Operations’ recommended a long-range barrage of 
Krasnaya Gorka by six heavy monitors backed by four battleships and three aircraft carriers, followed 
by special monitors armed with enormous 18- inch caliber guns to bombard Kronstadt harbor itself from 
nearly 20 miles away. 
However, the Board of Admiralty refused to sanction this sort of risky, allout assault and the War 
Cabinet prohibited overt strikes5. This angered the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir 
Sydney Fremantle, who wrote of the ‘necessity for the formation of a policy with respect to the Baltic 
Provinces’. Already a newly completed, expensive light cruiser (HMS Cassandra) had struck a mine 
and sank off the coast of Estonia. ‘If operations take place in May in the Gulf of Petrograd’, he warned, 
 
we must be prepared for losses, both of ships and men. These losses would be incurred against an 
enemy with whom we are not even formally at war … in pursuit of no definite British interest, and in 
defence of a cause which is not even being supported by the resources of the State, other than the 
Naval forces6. 
 
By May 1919, although British forces were still engaged in a fighting withdrawal from Archangel and 
Murmansk in the far north, on the White Sea, the Whites were advancing under Supreme Leader 
Admiral Alexander Kolchak in the east, General Anton Denikin in the south, and Yudenich in the 
northwest, off the Baltic. Now the Admiralty informed Cowan that the Cabinet had authorized 
reinforcements in the form of submarines and coastal motor torpedo boats (‘CMBs’). Yet his fleet was 
only to ‘menace’ the Bolshevik forces based in Kronstadt, engage them if they sortied out to bombard 
the Estonian coastline, and protect Reval as a forward base. By 4 July it was stressed it was ‘not 
(repeat not) intended to attempt the destruction of the fortress of Kronstadt, but only of enemy naval 
forces’, yet two days later the Admiralty cleared Cowan for carrying out coastal bombardments of his 
own (against Krasnaya Gorka), ‘as long as ships can operate in waters which are believed free of 
mines’7. This was enough for Cowan, who established an airfield on the Finnish coast and began 
bombing raids on Kronstadt. On 18 August, as the defenders were sufficiently distracted in an anti-
aircraft posture, he unleashed a well-timed, coordinated strike right into Kronstadt harbour with seven 
fast CMBs. These managed to damage one Soviet battleship with a torpedo hit, while only four 
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managed to escape under a hail of Russian fire. The Bolsheviks retaliated two weeks later when one of 
their submarines sank a British destroyer, and three days after this a Russian mine claimed another, 
HMS Verulam. But the Kronstadt raid succeeded in giving the British and their allies a sense of 
strategic initiative. 
Lenin now contemplated not only the probable loss of Petrograd, even if the Red Army reorganizing 
under Trotsky could save Moscow, but the need for disarming the stated raison d’être of British 
intervention by assuring the Baltic States recognition of their independence from Russia (something 
which the Whites refused to do.)8 When Estonian leaders asked London to confirm its policy on the 
Baltic Question, Lord Curzon, the Acting Foreign Secretary, informed them on 25 September 1919 that 
they were indeed free to choose for themselves whatever they wished, including negotiating a peace 
with Soviet Russia9. 
 
By then, Lloyd George had also openly questioned the expediency of reuniting Russia under the old 
regime — since this was tantamount to rebuilding the Russian Empire. At the Lord Mayor’s Banquet at 
the Guildhall, on 8 November, the Prime Minister declared that no more aid was to be sent to the 
Whites, thus sealing their fate, and on the 17th he paraphrased to the House of Commons his 19th-
century predecessor Benjamin Disraeli, ‘who regarded a great, gigantic, colossal, growing Russia 
rolling onwards like a glacier towards Persia and the borders of Afghanistan and India as the greatest 
menace the British Empire could be confronted with’10. Hence, while the ‘freedom of the Baltic States’ 
(as well as Finland, the Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Belarus, and Crimea11) was the stated 
aim of British foreign policy, it was ultimately in Britain’s best interests better to have a divided Russia, 
whether Red or White — and at the height of the Civil War only Lenin proved willing to accept these 
stark terms. 
Yudenich’s subsequent campaign to capture Petrograd in October 1919, ostensibly with Estonian and 
British military and naval support, was therefore a tragic farce. The Admiralty despatched only one 15-
inch gunned monitor, HMS Erebus, to Cowan. She arrived too late to support the Estonian First 
Division, which predictably advanced beyond the range of Cowan’s cruisers only to be mauled by 
Krasnaya Gorka’s landward defenses manned by a full garrison12. The long-awaited, classic duel 
between the heavy British warship and Russian fort then proved anticlimactic. Krasnaya Gorka’s 
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gunnery was much more accurate than the British expected, aided by an observation balloon, obliging 
the Erebus to shift positions ‘dangerously at the edge of the minefield’. British aerial spotters, forced 
into low cloud cover by Russian anti-aircraft fire, meanwhile could not aid the monitor’s accuracy at long 
range13. Cowan’s fleet withdrew out of range, along with the bloodied Estonians, exposing Yudenich’s 
left flank. Soon, the entire White offensive was rolled back by avenging Reds and the ‘Northwestern 
Army’ disintegrated; its survivors interred in Estonia at Moscow’s request.  
Cowan then set to work writing the history as one of Russian incompetence on the battlefield and 
stubbornness politically to accept the Baltic States as permanent buffer zones. ‘[General Yudenich] and 
all his Commanders,’ he complained to the Admiralty, 
 
have relied on the Tanks with their British Personnel achieving the impossible on every sector of the 
front, in the same spirit that they have often inferred that my Force of Light Cruisers and Destroyers 
should steam through the Mines, past the Forts at point blank range, and up to Kronstadt and its Forts, 
then to capture but not injure the Warships there and hoist the Russian Flag for them14. 
 
Yudenich in turn protested that he was never made aware of Cowan and the Estonian’s intentions 
against Krasnaya Gorka — and compelling Kronstadt to surrender. Was it not agreed that his forces 
were ‘liberating Russia from oppressors’ and to secure a communist-free government ‘under which 
Russia could rapidly revive’? Cowan could only affirm that the Estonian Army, with the backing of the 
Royal Navy, had been ‘acting in the interests of your cause, and the cause of Humanity, with an aim 
common to yours; namely the liberation of Petrograd and Kronstadt and the surrounding country from 
Bolshevic [sic] rule’.15 
 
But defeating a common enemy was clearly not the same thing as being allies. The British Cabinet had 
by then already admitted ‘it could not be said that the Navy had been used to its fullest extent to assist 
in the advance of General Yudenich’16. As for the Soviets, this half-hearted, one-handed, double-faced 
show of force on the part of the British ‘imperialists’ in the Russian Civil War was a major propaganda 
coup. As Trotsky later reported to the Central Executive Committee in Moscow, ‘They thought our 
sailors would not stand up to a bombardment by 15-inch guns, but our sailors held firm, and Krasnaya 
Gorka and Kronstadt are now more firmly in our hands than ever’. British firepower was no match for 
the valor of the Russian proletariat17. Stalin capitalized on this defiance of Allied sea power even more 
a generation later, when The Unforgettable Year 1919, an expensive biopic directed by Mikheil 
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Chiaureli in 1951, depicted him personally directing the return-fire of stalwart Russian gunners of 
Krasnaya Gorka against a vast British armada18.  
After one hundred years, British naval intervention in the Baltic in 1919 remains a complicated area of 
study, with many actors in play with overlapping, competing agendas — which themselves shifted 
almost on a weekly basis in response to events as they unfolded, from one end of Russia to another. 
The stock historical narrative from a British perspective is that of altruistic national liberation thanks to 
naval supremacy, as epitomized by Geoffrey Bennett’s Cowan’s War, originally published during the 
height of the Cold War, in 1961, and reprinted in today’s climate of anti-Putin hysteria as Freeing the 
Baltic 1918–1920 (Pen & Sword, 2017). 
But a close reading of the historical record fails to sustain this: The Baltic States all but freed 
themselves; Cowan was not able to sink the Red Fleet nor capture Krasnaya Gorka, the ‘key’ to 
Kronstadt, which also unlocked the gates to Petrograd. Both the British rear-admiral and Admiralty 
attempted to blame the War Cabinet — British politicians attempting to have their Russian cake and eat 
it too. ‘Supposing a French Army landed at Dover to help us subjugate Ireland?’, mused former First 
Sea Lord ‘Jackie’ Fisher. ‘I guess we should all forget whether we were Tories or Carsons or Smillies, 
and unite to get this French army out of our Archangel’19. Yet senior naval professionals also routinely 
acquiesced in the pretension of sea power’s ‘moral effect’. As dangerous and perhaps irresponsible as 
exposing light cruisers and destroyers was in the face of superior Russian naval units and coastal 
defenses, the stated belief was that local allies would be encouraged enough by the sheer sight of a 
British man of war to help tip the scales in the contest over Russian hearts and minds. 
Likewise, the sight of the Union Jack at their doorstep should terrify the cowardly Bolsheviks. Cowan 
was buoyant enough to assert on 21 October 1919 that ‘a few shots now from a Long Range Monitor 
would, I think, end the matter’ against Krasnaya Gorka. He had also fully expected his enemy to 
destroy his own warships, lay down his arms, and walk away from his capital city on the threat of naval 
blockade and starvation by British forces. More than that, Cowan thought this result ‘infinitely preferable 
than to ultimately allow the [White] Russians to regain possession of them … ’20. It was almost as if the 
entire Dardanelles and Gallipoli campaign had never happened four years before. And while the 
Edwardian British may have been successful in playing their own allies off against one another, in the 
name of geopolitical interests, in the free-for-all, mapchanging aftermath of the First World War, they 
failed to either ‘strangle Bolshevism in its cradle’ or win the hearts and minds of their former, fellow 
imperial Entente partner. ‘“Betrayal” was now the word most often associated with Allied intervention 
whenever the subject came to be discussed in memoirs or the émigré press’, notes one historian. But 
The Times of 10 November 1919 was blunter, asking, 
 
Can this practice of blowing hot and cold, not merely alternately, but simultaneously, have any other 
effect than to cause the British name to stink in the nostrils of all patriotic Russians, and to neutralize in 
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advance the sacrifices in money and material which the Government, on behalf of the country, have 
made?21 
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